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In this article, we propose the use of tax payments accruing from the commercialization of
research findings as a measure of research benefits complementing the existing range of evalu-
ation tools. We place this novel approach to assess the economic returns to publicly funded
research in the context of previous studies and highlight its advantages. The application of our
method over a long period is demonstrated with the example of saccharin, which was discovered
in the context of a curiosity-driven fundamental research project. In our study, we focused on
Monsanto’s commercial saccharin production finding notable returns.
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1. Introduction
It is now well established that research—including notably
curiosity-driven fundamental research—is important for
the wealth and economic growth of a country (Advisory
Council on Scientiﬁc Policy 1960; Byatt and Cohen
1969; Kay and Llewellyn Smith 1985; Pavitt 1991;
Roessner 1993; Klevorick et al. 1995; Narin et al. 1997;
Gulbrandsen 2009; Vincett 2010). The impacts of research
on the economy are multidimensional and sometimes
occur through complex and indirect pathways (van Raan
2000; Martin and Tang 2006). They include the creation of
new knowledge in its broadest sense (Hoppe and Pfa¨hler
2001; Scott et al. 2002; Geiger 2004)—inﬂuencing, e.g. cor-
porate research (Balconi et al. 2010) or productivity (Link
1996)—the introduction of advanced instrumentation
(Price 1984), public health beneﬁts (Byatt and Cohen
1969; Martin and Tang 2006), the output of trained gradu-
ates (David et al. 1992; Zellner 2003), the formation of
social networks or ‘invisible colleges’ (Price 1984), and of
course the commercialization of research ﬁndings and
discoveries (Gulbrandsen 2009). These different types of
economic impacts of research have received considerable
attention in numerous assessment studies, which have been
conducted in the past for both public accountability
reasons and to improve future policy decisions [a useful
overview can be found in Marjanovic et al. (2009)]. In
general, the majority of these studies reported considerable
returns on investment for the country funding the research,
some of them exceeding returns on stock (Arnold and
Bala´zs 1998).
However, there is no generally applicable method that
can take into account all the diverse impacts of research
introduced above at the same time (Arnold and Bala´zs
1998; Tassey 2003). By necessity, previous studies have
focused on evaluating selected impacts of research. To
complement the existing range of techniques, we present
in Section 2, a novel approach to assess the economic
returns to publicly funded research and place it in
context of previous evaluation studies. We propose the
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use of tax payments accruing from the commercialization
of research ﬁndings—largely neglected by existing
studies—as a measure of the beneﬁts to a particular
country. The application of our approach is not limited
to a speciﬁc kind of research (fundamental or applied, curi-
osity-driven or mission-oriented), as long as it led to iden-
tiﬁable tax revenue.
In Section 3, we demonstrate the application of our
approach in detail with an example of a curiosity-driven
fundamental research project, which serendipitously led to
a marketable product—saccharin. As the sweetener was
discovered already in 1878, the case offered a unique
long-term valuation perspective, which is rarely provided
in the literature. The results of the calculations and the
implications for the applicability of our method are dis-
cussed in Section 4. In the ﬁnal section, we highlight the
conclusions that can be drawn from our case study, and we
describe how our method could be implemented in future
evaluation studies.
Besides serving as an example for the implementation of
our approach, the saccharin case in itself is worth consider-
ing, as it presents further evidence that curiosity-driven
academic fundamental research can lead to successful com-
mercial ventures and to direct paybacks on the initial
research investment. The history of the case starts in
1876 when Ira Remsen was appointed as professor of
chemistry at the newly founded Johns Hopkins
University in Baltimore, MD—the ﬁrst university in the
USA to deﬁne research as the core of its educational
pursuits (Hannaway 1976). His research interests lay in
the synthesis of novel coal-tar derivatives to work out fun-
damental chemical principles without having particular ap-
plications in mind (Noyes and Norris 1932; Getman 1980),
and his commitment to curiosity-driven research is well-
documented (Hannaway 1976; Kauffman and Priebe 1978;
Roth and Lu¨ck 2011). In the course of one research
project, his fellow Constantin Fahlberg synthesized
‘benzoic sulﬁnide’ in 1878, which was accidentally found
to taste remarkably sweet. Importantly, Fahlberg did not
neglect this ﬁnding as unwanted ‘by-product’ of his re-
search but instead went on to commercialize what he
called saccharin in the mid-1880s by founding a company
in Germany (Beyer 2005). The large-scale manufacturing
of saccharin in the USA began when John F. Queeny in
1901 built up his company Monsanto in St. Louis, MO,
speciﬁcally for the production of saccharin (Forrestal
1977).
The circumstances of the discovery and the entrepre-
neurial, regulatory, and wartime inﬂuences on the fate of
saccharin as Monsanto’s ﬁrst product are described else-
where (Forster and Seeger in preparation a, in preparation
b). References to other relevant literature on saccharin are
provided therein as well. We have extended the informa-
tion provided by these publications with data obtained
from archival material—an extensive and largely
untapped source of data for valuations—to compile a
solid foundation for our calculations of the tax revenue
and ultimately of the beneﬁts accruing from Monsanto’s
saccharin operations.
Saccharin was chosen as a case because it allowed for a
reasonable demonstration of our approach in a compara-
tively well-deﬁned setting. For instance, it was suitable to
limit the calculations of the tax revenue to Monsanto,
which produced saccharin from 1901–72, as, ﬁrstly, its cor-
porate records are accessible through the Washington
University in St. Louis; secondly, it was the ﬁrst US
company to produce the sweetener; thirdly, it was once
the World’s largest producer of saccharin; fourthly, the
discovery of saccharin at a US university suggested the
consideration of a US company.
2. Method and scope
The idea to evaluate government ﬁnanced research is of
course not new, be it for general quality control, for as-
sessing the inﬂuences of policy measures, or for public ac-
countability due to the presence of many competing and
justiﬁable areas requiring public expenditure such as health
care, education, or energy (Luukkonen-Gronow 1987;
Arnold and Bala´zs 1998). As the focus of the present
article lies on the economic impacts of research, we do
not discuss in detail widely used methods such as peer
review and bibliometrics, which are established in assess-
ments of the scientiﬁc quality of research but normally
cannot be used to account for its economic impacts
(Luukkonen-Gronow 1987; Arnold and Bala´zs 1998;
Schmoch and Schubert 2009). Instead, we focus on
studies that were conducted for the latter purpose. As men-
tioned before, Marjanovic et al. (2009) provide a useful
overview of evaluation studies including a historical
perspective. The following paragraphs thus serve for
illustrating purposes only, raising no claim to
completeness.
Although the amount of publications dealing with the
economic impacts of (publicly funded) research is
increasing, only a minority of them presents numerical es-
timates for the alleged returns. For instance, some of the
seminal studies in the ﬁeld do not include a calculation of
economic returns. This is the case with Jewkes et al. (1969)
who analyzed more than 50 inventions—including several
cases stemming from corporate R&D departments—re-
garding the environment of their emergence (the ﬁrst
edition was published already in 1958). The situation
looks similar in a very famous study, commonly known
by the name TRACES, which was commissioned by the
National Science Foundation and conducted by the IIT
Research Institute (1968).
The paper by Griliches (1958) is still one of the most
famous publications actually featuring the calculations of
return rates. To estimate the input parameters, Griliches
relied mainly on survey data. Also using surveys,
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Mansﬁeld (1991) attempted to calculate the social rate of
return from worldwide investments in academic research.
Later, Link and Scott (2004) used estimates obtained from
interviews to assess the beneﬁts and costs related to a
speciﬁc R&D program.
The returns on (bio-)medical research were studied by
Weisbrod (1971) and Fudenberg (1973), using their own
estimations and ofﬁcial data. Furthermore, the case study
by Chien and Silverstein (1993) is notable because the
authors applied multipliers provided by the Department
of Commerce to extend their calculations of the beneﬁts
of monoclonal antibodies to secondary impacts, such as
employment at companies in the supply chain. The frame-
work by Murphy and Topel (2003), in contrast, was based
on theoretical assumptions on the beneﬁts accruing from
extensions of the life cycle consumptions and the expected
utilities of individuals.
Econometric studies represent a further important
approach to measure the returns on research investments.
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991), for instance, used a frame-
work based on total factor productivity to examine the
association between R&D and productivity growth with
longitudinal microdata. A comprehensive review of econo-
metric studies is provided by Hall et al. (2009).
Despite the individual attractiveness of each method
applied in the studies discussed above, none of these
approaches can single-handedly take into account all the
diverse impacts of research, as mentioned in Section 1.
Additionally, more or less severe disadvantages and
biases are associated with the application of these tech-
niques. Survey-based studies, for instance, may be
subject to ﬂaws resulting from low response rates, untruth-
ful respondents, and subjective answers (Martin and Salter
1996: 13; Salter and Martin 2001: 513; Marjanovic et al.
2009), and it is unclear whether the views expressed by
participants should really be used as a measure for
economic beneﬁts (Luukkonen-Gronow 1987).
Econometric studies, on the other hand, rely on assump-
tions that may be unrealistic or unsuited to relate beneﬁts
to research projects (Salter and Martin 2001: 513); e.g. it is
a gross oversimpliﬁcation to assume that companies have
invariant production functions and that every innovation
impacts existing production functions instead of creating
new ones (Link 1996: 337; Martin and Salter 1996: 17;
Georghiou and Roessner 2000: 661). Further, these
studies suggest that intensifying scientiﬁc research is
proﬁtable for the economy, but they do not differenti-
ate between speciﬁc research areas (Arnold and Bala´zs
1998: 2).
In the following, we suggest the consideration of tax
payments accruing from the commercialization of
research outcomes as a measure to complement the
existing range of techniques to assess the economic
returns to R&D. Our approach can be applied to value
research projects, which led or probably will lead to iden-
tiﬁable tax-relevant impacts arising from new product
introductions or economies owing to new knowledge. To
obtain meaningful results, the application is limited to
projects funded by governments or nonproﬁt organiza-
tions and foundations. Privately funded research should
be gauged according to its private returns, such as the
net operating proﬁt after tax. Still, our approach is an ap-
propriate tool to assess various types of research, like
academic or industrial research, basic or applied
research, curiosity-driven or mission-oriented research, de-
velopment, and past or present projects.
Tax payments present convenient inputs for beneﬁt-cost
analyses and calculations of the net present value (NPV) or
the internal rate of return (IRR). The latter two metrics
stemming originally from corporate ﬁnance allow for com-
parisons with returns on corporate R&D investments and,
because of their widespread use in industry, potentially
foster the understanding by business professionals for
such studies (Tassey 2003).
Our approach has several advantages justifying its ap-
plication in addition to the established methods. It assesses
a direct beneﬁt to countries funding research, which has
been largely neglected by existing studies. The consider-
ation of ﬁscal income is intuitive, as it is clear that these
funds can be used to ﬁnance new research or to support
other areas of expenditure. For instance, it is possible to
determine how many research projects could be funded
with the returns on only one single successful program.
Furthermore, our approach can be executed on different
levels of complexity, such as with or without substitution
effects or taxes arising from secondary impacts, depending
on the goal of a study and on the available resources. For
instance, it can be limited to an in-depth analysis of a well-
deﬁned case considering a small number of directly
involved scientists and companies, as in the case of sac-
charin presented hereafter. Alternatively, it is possible to
apply it to a larger number of research groups and entire
industries including their indirect and induced impacts, if
appropriate multipliers are available, e.g. for the biotech-
nology industry (Ernst and Young 2000). Depending on
the case and the goal of a study, short- or long-term
impacts of the involved research projects can be
considered.
Recently Linquiti (2012) suggested including risk in the
ex-post valuation of R&D. His reasoning can be con-
sidered in studies using our approach as well, but it
should be noted that the author excluded basic research,
as it entails great uncertainties, which cannot be easily
quantiﬁed.
Our method can draw on different data sources, which
have to be selected according to their availability. In a
historic example like saccharin, the use of archival
material, such as annual reports, meeting minutes, and
industry publications, might be necessary to complement
publicly available data making a study more laborious. In
other cases, for instance, regarding the biotechnology
industry, published documents should be sufﬁcient to
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retrieve the relevant numbers. For very recent examples
and forward projecting studies, it is even conceivable to
obtain data from involved companies directly.
Finally, a further advantage of our method is the con-
sideration of actual cash ﬂows, which involves fewer as-
sumptions compared with, e.g. econometric tools.
Of course, it should be remarked that the preparation of
evaluation case studies using our approach entails the
same issues inherent to case studies in general (Salter and
Martin 2001; Martin and Tang 2006): performing case
studies is time-consuming, and their results are difﬁcult
to generalize. Further, the focus on a few research
projects leading to the desired detailed understanding
might concomitantly limit the view for the big picture.
Case studies have also been critiqued because they tend
to consider successful projects only. However, Scherer
and Harhoff (2000) argue that in a portfolio of research
projects, there are always just a few successful ones, which
may or may not cover the expenses of the remaining
projects.
In the following section, we use the discovery and com-
mercialization of saccharin to demonstrate the application
of our approach.
3. Example of application: saccharin
As mentioned before, we chose to demonstrate our
approach with saccharin as a well-deﬁned example,
limiting our focus on Remsen’s research group at The
Johns Hopkins University and on Monsanto’s commercial
production of the sweetener. Hereafter we assess the public
returns on the investment in Remsen’s curiosity-driven
fundamental research project, ignoring Fahlberg’s private
development costs and all private rates of return.1 Data
regarding the research expenses of the Remsen group were
found in the Special Collections of The Johns Hopkins
University in Baltimore, MD. Figures related to the com-
mercialization of saccharin were retrieved from
Monsanto’s company records held by the Archives of the
Washington University in St. Louis, MO, and additionally
from government publications available through the
Internet or at the National Archives in College Park, MD.
We start by presenting the calculations of the tax
payments accruing from Monsanto’s saccharin operations,
as this is the core of our approach. This is challenging for
the evaluator, as the company of course did not break its
tax payments down into the shares of individual products.
One of our main tasks was, therefore, to ﬁnd appropriate
assumptions to estimate saccharin’s share in the total taxes
paid by Monsanto during the 72 years of saccharin pro-
duction. In the following, the rationales for the calcula-
tions in the individual years are presented. Years having
similar or identical rationales were consolidated in respect-
ive tables. The history of saccharin as Monsanto’s ﬁrst
product has been discussed elsewhere (Forster and Seeger
in preparation b) and is only repeated below as far as ne-
cessary for understanding. Table 1 summarizes historical
milestones.
The St. Louis businessman John F. Queeny founded his
company Monsanto in 1901 speciﬁcally for the
manufacturing of saccharin. Operations commenced on 6
March 1902. For the early years up to 1924, no annual
accounts of the taxes paid by Monsanto were found in
the company records. Therefore, the approximate tax
burden is calculated using the appropriate tax rates,
which are detailed in online Appendix A. Several publica-
tions served as sources to obtain the tax rates (Chirelstein
et al. 1963; Hill 1913; Pyle 1922; Seligman 1970; Spaulding
1927; Tax Foundation 2012; United States Bureau of the
Census 1915). Starting in 1924 the annual provisions for
income taxes are available from Monsanto’s annual
reports.2 These values are used for the calculation of the
ﬁscal income generated by saccharin from 1924 until its
production by Monsanto ceased in 1972.
The estimation of the annual share of saccharin in
Monsanto’s total tax payments is tedious and has to be
adapted according to the data available for the respective
years. Whenever possible, the saccharin turnover as a per-
centage of total sales was calculated as a proxy for its share
in taxes. The capital bound for the production of sac-
charin, which would be needed for an exact calculation
of the property tax, or the proﬁtability of the saccharin
operations, required for a precise determination of the
income tax, are unknown for almost the entire time
span. With exception of the years 1901 to 1903, during
which the share is unambiguous because there was only
one product, three scenarios were developed for sac-
charin’s share in taxation for each year. The base
(medium) scenario calculated with the sales proxy men-
tioned above implies that the proﬁtability of the saccharin
operations represents exactly the average proﬁtability of
all Monsanto products—an assumption, which cannot be
applied to the entire time series, as described below.
Beginning with the medium scenario, a high (+50%) and
a low scenario (–50%) were developed. Based on all the
available information for the respective years contained in
annual reports, government publications, internal docu-
ments, etc., one of these three scenarios was chosen as
the realistic one. A detailed example for 1 year with
comments on every calculation step is provided in
online Appendix B. Additional comments on the year by
year calculations, which are not essential for the main
argument, can be found in online Appendix C.
The total ﬁscal income generated by Monsanto’s sac-
charin operations is provided in four different ways: the
mentioned high (H), medium (M), and low (L) scenarios,
and the realistic scenario, which represents the sum of all
values considered realistic in the individual years. For
clarity reasons, only the realistic scenario is shown
in each of the tables below, which indicate the scenario
(H/M/L) selected as the realistic one.
236 . S. P. Forster and S. Seeger
As saccharin was Monsanto’s ﬁrst and—until the intro-
duction of caffeine in 1904—only product, all taxes paid in
the years 1901 through 1903 and a large part of 1904’s
taxes (as in the medium scenario) are attributable to sac-
charin (Table 2).3 Although Monsanto’s operations
yielded a loss in each of these 4 years, the tax was due
on property, and it is therefore assumed that it had to be
paid anyway. From 1905 to 1907 Monsanto introduced
several new products, such as vanillin, iron, bismuth,
thymol, and phenacetin,4 most likely associated with a re-
duction of saccharin’s share in bound capital and thus
taxes. In 1905 we begin to apply our high/medium/low
scenario framework, explaining the tax ﬂuctuation from
1904 to 1905.
According to notes from Jules Bebie’s diary—Bebie was
one of three skilled Swiss chemists working for Queeny
(Forster and Seeger in preparation b)—Monsanto made
$8,000 proﬁts on saccharin sales in 1910. This corresponds
to 10.53% of all proﬁts if products with negative returns
are not considered (Table 3).5 The percentage can directly
be applied to calculate the share in income taxation, as
there is no need to produce three scenarios from a proﬁt
ﬁgure. The income tax in 1909 is calculated retrospectively
with the same value. The share in property taxation is
estimated to be the same as in the previous years, as no
new products were introduced (Forrestal 1977: 260). A
notable increase in assets from 1909 to 1910 explains the
higher tax payments in 1910.
In the leaﬂet ‘Information regarding Monsanto for pur-
chasers of Mortgage’, issued in 1920, the only kind of taxes
mentioned for the years 1915 through 1919 are federal
taxes (Table 4).6 The reason possibly is that property
Table 1. Key events in the history of Monsanto related to saccharin
Year Event
1878 Discovery of saccharin by Fahlberg supervised by Remsen at The Johns Hopkins University
1887 Market introduction of saccharin in Germany by Fahlberg, List & Co.
1901 Formation of Monsanto Chemical Works in St. Louis speciﬁcally for the production of saccharin
1902 Production of saccharin Monsanto commenced
Start of price war by incumbent German companies
1903 First exports of saccharin Monsanto
1904 Expansion of Monsanto’s product portfolio
1905 Monsanto’s ﬁrst proﬁtable year
1912–59 Implementation of Food Inspection Decision (FID) 135/142 curtailing US saccharin market
1914–8 Sugar shortage during World War I leading to high saccharin demand and prices
1920 Largest producer of saccharin in the World because of competitors’ problems in World War I
1925 Legal proceedings against Monsanto violating FID 142 ended after hung jury
No domestic competitor in the saccharin market left
1941–5 Sugar shortage during World War II leading to high saccharin demand
1950 Introduction of cyclamate sweeteners by Abbott
1952 Market entry of Maumee Chemical Company using an alternative synthesis process for saccharin
1963–5 Repeated considerable expansion of capacity to satisfy demand
1964– Pricing pressure due to domestic and foreign competition
1972 Management decision to shut down Monsanto’s saccharin production
Source: Forster and Seeger (in preparation b).
Table 2. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1901–8)
Year Scenario Total sales [$] Saccharin
sales [$]
Saccharin
sales [%]
Total assets [$] Tax rate [%] Total tax [$] Saccharin
tax [$]
1901 N 0 0 0 5000 0.55a 28a 28a
1902 N 21,870 21,870 100 18,500 0.55a 102a 102a
1903 N 39,275 39,275 100 27,200 0.55a 150a 150a
1904 N n/d 36,456 n/a 35,100 0.55a 193a 164a
1905 M 112,000 33,338 30a 46,600 0.55a 256a 115a
1906 M 120,000 33,005 28a 76,900 0.55a 423a 118a
1907 M 151,300 29,856 20a 96,900 0.55a 533a 107a
1908 M 168,200 n/d n/a 117,300 0.55a 645a 129a
n/d: no data; n/a: not applicable; acalculated values; N: not according to high/medium/low; M: medium.
Sources: see text.
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taxes were small compared with income taxes during those
years, as proﬁts in excess of prewar earnings were charged
heavily, which increased Monsanto’s income tax burdens
disproportionately. Consequentially, property taxation is
no longer considered for the calculations of the remaining
years until 1924, when the total taxes paid by Monsanto
become available from its annual reports anyway. As the
federal taxes in the leaﬂet are only provided in the form of
a sum over 1915 through 1919 ($2,164,850), the income tax
paid in each individual year is still calculated using the
income tax rates (including excess proﬁts tax) and sac-
charin’s share in total sales.7
The considerable increase in tax payments accruing from
the saccharin operations from 1915 to 1917 can be ex-
plained by several inﬂuencing factors: ﬁrstly, incomes
were markedly heavier taxed during the War; secondly,
sales reached new records every year; thirdly, the scenario
was changed from medium to high from 1916 to 1917. The
subsequent decrease in 1918 and 1919 is due to lower
relative proﬁts and saccharin’s lower share in those proﬁts.
The period between 1919 and 1942 lacks information
about the value or amount of Monsanto’s saccharin
sales. Data about the sales of saccharin and—later—
ﬂavors in general, provided by the United States Tariff
Commission’s reports on synthetic organic chemicals,8
served as an estimation basis for these years, but these
estimations are of course marred by uncertainty. In 1920
the total production of the saccharin industry plummeted
to 25% of the 1919 ﬁgure because sugar became more
readily available again after the war.9 This translates
together with markedly reduced tax rates into the large
difference between the tax payments of the 2 years.
As Monsanto was the largest of ﬁve saccharin producers
in the USA after the War and, until 1925, squeezed every
one of its rivals out of the market (Forster and Seeger in
preparation b), it is assumed that the company’s share of
the total market was 80% already in 1920. Furthermore,
this also implies to use the medium scenarios for the cal-
culation of saccharin’s tax burden during those years.
Regarding Table 5, the tenfold increase of tax payments
from 1922 to 1923 resulted from signiﬁcantly better total
net incomes.
As there were only two producers left in the market in
1924, the United States Tariff Commission omitted the
detailed reporting of saccharin production and sales
ﬁgures for competitive reasons. Therefore, these numbers
had to be estimated for the year 1924 and all subsequent
years until 1942 using the production and sales ﬁgures
of the entire ﬂavor category. Furthermore, saccharin
market prices are unknown for the years 1925 through
Table 4. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1915–9)
Year Scenario Total
sales
[$,000]
Saccharin
sales
[$ ,000]
Saccharin
sales [%]
Total
income
[$ ,000]
Income
tax rate [%]
Saccharin
income
tax [%]
Saccharin
income
tax [$]
1915 M 1,240 171 14a 561 1 14a 793a
1916 M 2,929 720 25a 905 2 25a 4616a
1917 H 4,297 1,475 34a 775 29 52a 163,772a
1918 H 9,672 2,701 28a 322 42.5 42a 99,246a
1919 H 7,068 1,318 19a 873 31.5 28a 111,135a
acalculated values; M: medium; H: high.
Sources: see text.
Table 3. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1909–14)
Year Scenario
[property,
income]
Total
sales
[$]
Saccharin
sales
[$]
Total
income
[$]
Income
tax rate
[%]
Saccharin
income tax
[%]
Saccharin
income tax
[$]
Total
assets
[$]
Property
tax rate
[%]
Saccharin
property tax
[%]
Saccharin
property tax
[$]
Saccharin
total tax
[$]
1909 M, M 232,900 n/d 15,800 1 10 11a 154,200 0.55 20 170a 181a
1910 M, N 358,000 n/d 29,300 1 10.53a 26a 267,300 0.55 20 294a 320a
1911 M, M 401,000 n/d 66,900 1 10 63a 292,200 0.55 20 321a 384a
1912 M, M 462,000 n/d 80,700 1 9 69a 388,700 0.55 18 385a 454a
1913 M, M 517,000 50,000 81,500 1 9a 74a 437,800 0.55 18 433a 508a
1914 M, M 684,000 95,000 150,200 1 14a 212a 490,400 0.55 15 405a 617a
n/d: no data; estimated values; acalculated values; N: not according to high/medium/low; M: medium.
Sources: see text.
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1938. For the interpolation, it was assumed that the prices
steadily fell from their 1925 level to 1938’s level.10
Concomitantly, the ratio of the price of toluene—an im-
portant precursor in Monsanto’s saccharin synthesis—in
respect of the saccharin price increased from 0.19 in 1925
to 0.23 in 1938 curtailing the margin. As it is probable that
Monsanto was able to capitalize on learning effects in its
saccharin production, it is nevertheless assumed that the
medium scenario for saccharin’s share in taxation is
realistic.
In 1922 saccharin sales made up 50% of the dollar value
of all ﬂavor category sales, but as new products were
introduced, this ratio dropped. For instance, in 1924, all
products, for which detailed ﬁgures could not be pub-
lished, accounted for 39% of the total ﬂavor sales value
and for only for 19% of the sales volume. It is obvious that
saccharin is bound to those two limits, but considering its
sales volume and value in the early 1920s, it seems that it
must represent the bulk of these residual numbers.11 As
mentioned before, starting in 1924, Monsanto’s total
income tax payments became available from its annual
reports explaining the difference between 1923 and 1924.
The ﬂuctuations of the values in Table 6 themselves are
mainly caused by the indirect calculation based on the
total ﬂavor category sales, as introduced above, which
depend on the faithful reporting of the involved
companies. Further inﬂuences include a marked increase
in Monsanto’s total income taxes from 1927 to 1928 and a
considerable decrease from 1929 to 1930 as well as the
acquisition of Merrimac Chemical Company in 1929 re-
sulting in higher group sales (Forrestal 1977: 74).
In 1936 the structure of the United States Tariff
Commission’s publication ‘Dyes and Other Synthetic
Organic Chemicals in the United States’ was revised
(Table 7). From then on, ﬂavors and perfume materials
were reported as one group, while concomitantly
Table 5. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1920–3)
Year Scenario Saccharin
sales total
[$,000]
Monsanto
share [%]
Saccharin
sales of
total [%]
Total income
[$ ,000]
Income tax
rate [%]
Saccharin
income
tax [%]
Saccharin
income
tax [$]
1920 M 419 80 4a 772 11.5 4a 4,000a
1921 M 522 85 12a (132) 11.5 12a 9,240a,b
1922 M 630 80 14a 53 13.5 13.5a 1,064a
1923 M 662 90 15a 447 13.5 15a 10,420a
estimated values; acalculated values; M: medium.
bMonsanto recorded a loss in that year making it impossible to determine the tax burden using the income tax rate. The balance sheet in the annual report shows a liability
‘federal income taxes (in dispute)’ worth $77,332.07. The item is not reoccurring in 1922’s annual report, so that it is assumed that the balance was paid by Monsanto.
Saccharin’s share in taxation of 1921 is therefore calculated on this basis.
Sources: see text.
Table 6. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1924–35)
Year Scenario Total ﬂavor
sales [$ ,000]
Max. possible
saccharin
sales [$ ,000]
Monsanto
saccharin
sales [$ ,000]
Monsanto
total sales
[$ ,000]
Saccharin
income
tax [%]
Total income
tax [$,000]
Saccharin
income tax [$]
1924 M 1,471 574 563a 4,045 14a 30 4,200a
1925 M 1,409 402 387a 4,822 8a 31 2,480a
1926 M 1,483 386 379a 5,090 7.5a 62 4,650a
1927 M 1,435 438 362a 5,553 6.5a 82 5,330a
1928 M 1,296 408 368a 6,149 6a 170 10,200a
1929 M 3,517 440 379a 17,088 2a 230 4,600a
1930 M 2,739 356 324a 13,487 2.25a 105 2,363a
1931 M n/d n/d n/d 13,126 2 172 3,440a
1932 M n/d n/d n/d 11,408 2 232 4,640a
1933 M 1,797 368 312a 15,497 2a 422 8,440a
1934 M 1,929 386 254a 17,544 1.5a 482 7,230a
1935 M 2,095 492 332a 24,706 1.25a 645 8,063a
n/d: no data; estimated values; acalculated values; M: medium.
Sources: see text.
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discriminating between substances of coal-tar and non-
coal-tar origin. Consequently, the number of products in
saccharin’s category increased signiﬁcantly, rendering
comparisons less meaningful. Therefore, it was simply
assumed that the sales volume of saccharin increased
slightly but steadily until the beginning of World War II,
when the demand increased sharply due to shortages in
sugar supply (United States Tariff Commission 1946).
The prices for 1938–41 were extracted from an ofﬁcial
document prepared by Monsanto.12
Saccharin sales values and prices for the years 1942 and
1943 are known from Monsanto documents, which allow a
more precise estimation of saccharin’s share in taxation for
these 2 years (Table 8).13 According to the United States
Tariff Commission, high production levels still prevailed in
1944 and 1945. For the years 1946 through 1949 it was
assumed that saccharin production volumes and prices
steadily moved to their level of 1950, for which internal
Monsanto ﬁgures were found.14
No data about Monsanto’s saccharin production are
available until 1958 (Table 9). In the early 1950s Abbott
introduced its cyclamate sweeteners to the market.
However, in the beginning, cyclamates were no real
threat to saccharin due to their higher price.15 It was
even suggested that the introduction might have been
beneﬁcial for saccharin because many states were recon-
sidering their strict regulations toward saccharin and
because combination products of saccharin and cyclamates
were sold.16 It is thus assumed that Monsanto’s output
stayed ﬂat and eventually slightly declined as the
Maumee Chemical Company entered the ﬁeld with a
novel production process for saccharin in 1952.
According to the US Department of Agriculture, prices
were fairly constant.17 However, Monsanto felt compelled
to reduce its prices in late 1959 to counter Japanese
imports.18 Therefore, it seems appropriate to use the low
scenarios for the calculation of the taxes attributable to
saccharin from 1959 to 1962, when the demand and there-
fore capacity usage were increasing again.
The early sixties saw a rapid increase in consumption of
noncaloric sweeteners, as people started to use noncaloric
sweeteners to control their weight and to reduce sugar
Table 7. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1935–41)
Year Scenario Saccharin
production
[,000 lb.]
Saccharin
price [$/lb.]
Monsanto
saccharin
sales [$ ,000]
Monsanto
total sales
[$ ,000]
Saccharin
income tax [%]
Total income
tax [$,000]
Saccharin
income tax [$]
1935 M 255 1.3 332a 24,706 1.25a 645 8,063a
1936 M 260 1.2 312a 28,848 1a 1,029 10,290a
1937 M 265 1.1 292a 33,202 0.75a 1,030 7,725a
1938 M 270 1.0 266a 31,935 0.75a 854 6,405a
1939 M 275 1.0 278a 44,075 0.5a 1,508 7,540a
1940 H 280 1.2 329a 45,608 1.13a 3,508 39,465a
1941 H 500 1.3 601a 63,756 1.5a 9,609 144,135a
estimated values; acalculated values; M: medium; H: high; 1935 is shown for comparative reasons.
Sources: see text.
Table 8. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1942–50)
Year Scenario Saccharin
production
[,000 lb.]
Saccharin
price [$/lb.]
Monsanto
saccharin
sales [$ ,000]
Monsanto
total sales
[$ ,000]
Saccharin
income tax [%]
Total income
tax [$,000]
Saccharin
income tax [$]
1942 H 1,073a 1.3 1,393 69,147 3a 11,001 330,030a
1943 H 1,217a 1.1 1,393 81,697 2.63a 10,085 264,731a
1944 H 1,400 1.1 1,540a 86,996 2.63a 10,033 263,366a
1945 H 1,400 1.1 1,540a 95,339 2.25a 9,856 221,760a
1946 M 1,300 1.1 1,430a 101,767 1.5a 6,430 96,450a
1947 M 1,250 1.2 1,438a 143,403 1a 10,176 101,760a
1948 M 1,200 1.2 1,464a 161,609 1a 10,129 101,290a
1949 M 1,200 1.3 1,560a 165,925 1a 10,823 108,230a
1950 M 1,207 1.4a 1,679 227,135 0.75a 27,789 208,418a
estimated values; acalculated values; M: medium; H: high.
Sources: see text.
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intake, even if not medically necessary (Table 10).19 The
increased demand led Monsanto to expand its saccharin
production capacity by 50% to about 1.8 million pounds
annually by 1963 and again in 1965 to more than 3 million
pounds annually.20 Saccharin’s share in Monsanto’s total
sales was now only in the range of 0.1–0.2%.21 Despite the
favorable position in the market, we used the low scenarios
for the calculations of saccharin’s share in taxation starting
in 1965 until Monsanto’s exit of the saccharin market in
1972, as the company had to lower the prices again to
counter imports in 1964 and deplored pricing pressure in
the saccharin market in its 1969 annual report in spite of
record sales.22 Finally, in 1972, Monsanto stopped produc-
tion of saccharin because of poor performance due to the
competition of Sherwin-Williams and Japanese imports.
At this point, we cease the estimation of saccharin tax
data.
The tax payments presented in the tables above seem to
be quite substantial. To make a meaningful assertion as to
whether these values are still signiﬁcant when compared
with the research expenses, they have to be converted
into a form that allows such comparisons. The question
was approached in two different ways: on the one hand, we
discounted all the ﬁscal incomes to the year 1876—as a
preparation for the calculation of the beneﬁt to cost
ratio—and on the other hand, we considered the incomes
in individual years indexed with the consumer price index.
For the calculations, we used annual ﬁgures of long-
term US government bonds as discount rates. These are
also ofﬁcially applied by the Ofﬁce of Management and
Budget to estimate the returns on government investment
projects (Tassey 2003). The sum of all the discounted tax
payments is considerable in each of the four scenarios, as
can be inferred from Table 11.23
Table 9. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1951–9)
Year Scenario Saccharin
production
[,00 lb.]
Saccharin
price [$/lb.]
Monsanto
saccharin
sales [$ ,000]
Monsanto
total sales [$ ,000]
Saccharin income
tax [%]
Total income
tax [$,000]
Saccharin
income tax [$]
1951 M 1,143a 1.4 1,600 272,845 0.5a 38,643 193,215a
1952 M 1,143a 1.4 1,600 266,704 0.5a 18,088 90,440a
1953 M 1,000a 1.5 1,500 340,617 0.45a 23,060 103,770a
1954 M 933a 1.5 1,400 341,823 0.45a 18,854 84,843a
1955 M 875a 1.6 1,400 522,349 0.3a 36,898 110,694a
1956 M 906a 1.6 1,450 541,883 0.3a 30,764 92,292a
1957 M 938a 1.6 1,500 567,116 0.3a 29,862 89,586a
1958 M 1,011a 1.6 1,617 547,557 0.3a 23,052 69,156a
1959 L 1,000a 1.6 1,600 616,377 0.13a 36,796 45,995a
estimated values; acalculated values; M: medium; L: low.
Sources: see text.
Table 10. Calculations of taxes attributable to Monsanto’s saccharin operations (1960–72)
Year Scenario Saccharin
production
[,000 lb.]
Saccharin
price [$/lb.]
Monsanto
saccharin
sales [$ ,000]
Monsanto
total sales
[$ ,000]
Saccharin
income tax [%]
Total income
tax [$ ,000]
Saccharin
income tax [$]
1960 L 1,200 1.4 1,680a 890,114 0.08a 58,793 44,095a
1961 L 1,200 1.5 1,776a 932,916 0.08a 58,384 43,788a
1962 M 1,150 1.6 1,794a 1,063,195 0.15a 62,915 94,373a
1963 M 1,200 1.6 1,920a 1,192,270 0.15a 77,416 116,124a
1964 M 1,600 1.5 2,432a 1,358,678 0.2a 99,178 198,356a
1965 L 1,800 1.4 2,520a 1,468,147 0.08a 79,638 59,729a
1966 L 1,900 1.4a 2,682a 1,611,881 0.08a 76,420 57,315a
1967 L 2,100 1.3a 2,795a 1,632,357 0.08a 66,469 49,852a
1968 L 2,100 1.4a 2,862a 1,792,938 0.08a 82,107 61,580a
1969 L 2,500 1.3a 3,295a 1,938,838 0.08a 73,473 55,105a
1970 L 2,708a 1.5a 3,943a 1,971,632 0.1a 35,017 35,017a
1971 L 2,200 1.4 3,080a 2,087,100 0.05a 65,700 32,850a
1972 L 1,800 1.4 2,520a 2,225,400 0.05a 80,600 40,300a
estimated values; acalculated values; M: medium; L: low.
Sources: see text.
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The correspondence between Remsen and Gilman—the
ﬁrst President of The Johns Hopkins University—reveals
information about the funds available to Remsen for his
research projects when he acceded to his post. The relevant
letters of the two men have been discussed in detail else-
where (Forster and Seeger in preparation a). Using the
values provided in the letters and with some additional
estimation, it is possible to calculate the expenses of
Remsen’s research group in the years around the saccharin
discovery. To render the calculations more realistic, we
assume that saccharin was discovered in the context of a
research project lasting 5 years, and we estimate the costs
accordingly, although the discovery already happened
during the second project year. In the beginning when
Remsen came to The Johns Hopkins University, $5,000
was invested for chemicals and apparatus and further
$1,000 for scientiﬁc literature (ibid.). Remsen’s salary
was distributed over the 5 years as follows: $3,000 in
1877 and 1878, $3,500 in 1879 and 1880, and $4,000 in
1881. Further assuming recurring cost of chemicals, con-
sumables and the literature of $1,500 per year from 1878 to
1881, and a yearly increase in the number of assistants
from one in 1877 to ﬁve in 1881, each at a salary of
$1,000, the expenses total $44,000 or $38,107 when dis-
counted with the relevant rates (Table 12).
Comparing the expenses with the discounted tax
revenues, the values imply that—in the realistic scen-
ario—more than 10 research projects of a similar scale
could be funded in 1876 with the income generated by
saccharin as just one successfully commercialized
outcome of such a project. The beneﬁt to cost ratio is
thus more than 10 to 1, and the NPV in 1876 was $381,046.
When using a constant interest rate over the entire
duration (1876–1972), instead of choosing the interest
rates of each individual year, and setting the difference
of the discounted incomes and expenses to zero, the IRR
is obtained. In this metric, a project is proﬁtable as long as
its IRR is greater than the cost of capital.
0 ¼
X1972
i¼1901
Fiscal Incomei
ð1+IRRÞði1875Þ 
X1881
i¼1876
Research Investmenti
ð1+IRRÞði1875Þ
Calculating the IRR for the four saccharin scenarios, we
obtain the values in Table 13.
Compared with the rates that would be expected for
corporate projects, these values may seem small.
Nevertheless, in the realistic, high, and medium scenarios,
the values are more than twice as big as the average
interest paid on long-term government bonds, which
makes the venture proﬁtable.
The second way we chose to approach the question is
based on the consideration of individual years instead of
discounting and aggregating the values as above. Thereby,
the income in each individual year is compared with the
research expenses of an average year of the research
project. The meaning of this approach is different from
the previous one, as it determines the number of years,
in which the ﬁscal income generated from the saccharin
operations cover the annualized research expenses for a
similar project. Based on the total research investment
for 5 years of $44,000 calculated above, it is assumed
that the annual expenses amount to $9,000. After
indexing the ﬁscal incomes of all years to 1876,24 it
is determined whether the income of an individual
year sufﬁces to pay either less than one third of the
expenses; between one third and 100% of the expenses;
between one and three times the expenses; between three
and six times the expenses; or, ﬁnally, more than six times
the expenses. The results for the four scenarios are shown
in Figure 1.
Table 11. Sum of tax payments in the four scenarios discounted using
yields of long-term US government bonds
Scenario Realistic High Medium Low
Value in 1876 $419,152 $576,579 $384,447 $192,306
Indexed to 2011a $9,070,000 $12,500,000 $8,320,000 $4,160,000
aAdjusted using the purchasing power calculator by Lawrence Ofﬁcer and Samuel
H. Williamson, MeasuringWorth, www.measuringworth.com (last access 10 June
2013), 2011.
Table 12. Estimation of the annual expenses of Remsen’s research
group (1876–81)
Year Interest
rate [%]
Discount
factor
Expenses
[$]
Discounted
[$]
1876 3.66 1.0366 6,000 5,788
1877 3.81 1.0760 4,000 3,717
1878 3.97 1.1187 6,500 5,810
1879 3.96 1.1630 8,000 6,878
1880 3.63 1.2052 9,000 7,467
1881 3.13 1.2430 10,500 8,447
Total expenses 44,000 38,106
Indexed to 2011a 953,000 825,000
aAdjusted using the purchasing power calculator by Lawrence Ofﬁcer and Samuel
H. Williamson, MeasuringWorth, www.measuringworth.com (last access 10 June
2013), 2011.
Sources: Forster and Seeger (in preparation a).
Table 13. IRRs for the four scenarios
Scenario Realistic High Medium Low
IRR1876 7.68% 7.99% 7.20% 5.93%
Sources: see text.
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In 11 years of the realistic scenario, therefore, the annual
expenses of more than six research projects of a similar
scale could be ﬁnanced with the ﬁscal income ﬂowing
from Monsanto’s saccharin operations, equating—conser-
vatively calculated—to about 66 ‘project years’ in total.
Similarly, in 13 years more than three times the annual
expenses of a project could be covered, equating to 39
‘project years’, and in 11 years, more than one such
project could be ﬁnanced. In total, this means that
during the 72 years of Monsanto’s saccharin operations
the annual research expenses of a similar research project
could be covered at least 116 times or, alternatively stated,
at least more than 1.5 similarly sized projects could be
funded on average every year with the tax payments.
4. Discussion
We have demonstrated our research evaluation approach
based on tax payments with the example of saccharin. The
returns on the fundamental research project, which led to
the discovery of saccharin, are quite substantial because
they can cover the research expenditures of this project
and, additionally, for the expenditures of many (116), simi-
larly sized, projects. Nevertheless, the returns are relatively
low compared with rates known from econometric studies
and considering the uncertainties involved in fundamental
research. In the following, we discuss the factors that
inﬂuenced the results of the calculations and their import-
ance for the application of our method to other evaluation
settings.
Long-term evaluation studies of fundamental research
in particular often suffer from problems related to dis-
counting. Signiﬁcant time lags between the actual discov-
ery and its market introduction—in the example, this lag
lasted from 1878 to 1901—reduce the value of the dis-
counted incomes as well as the IRR, as they represent
periods requiring discounting without producing
incomes. Furthermore, considering an average product
lifecycle, early incomes, which by deﬁnition are less
heavily discounted, are lower compared with later
periods, when the product is established. In the case of
saccharin and Monsanto, this effect was very pronounced:
ﬁrstly, market sales at the turn of the century were rather
low; secondly, Monsanto dominated the market only after
the mid-twenties; thirdly, tax rates were minimal until
World War I. In addition to that, saccharin cannot be
considered to be a regular consumer product for many
years, as the sales were restricted by the government (see
Table 1). Saccharin turnovers in a free market environ-
ment probably would have been substantially bigger.
As mentioned in Section 2, the tax-based approach can
be conducted on different levels of complexity. Our study
on saccharin including only Monsanto’s tax payments, on
the one hand, allowed for an in-depth examination of the
case; on the other hand, this reduced of course the com-
parability to econometric studies, for instance, which
assess entire industries. Still, in future studies, it is
possible to apply our method to a set of companies or
even to an industry, as detailed in the conclusion below.
Regarding other aspects, our calculations are also rather
conservative. For instance, the taxes paid by Monsanto’s
employees, owners, and shareowners, and those of other
companies in the value chain (suppliers of raw materials
and vendors of saccharin) were not included. Also, import
duties on raw materials, saccharin or saccharin intermedi-
ates, as well as value added tax were ignored. Going even
one step back, a complete valuation would have to include
tax income arising from intangible effects of Remsen’s
research as well, such as knowledge creation beyond sac-
charin and training of skilled graduates. From a methodo-
logical point of view, it is conceivable to include such
factors in studies conducted with our approach.
However, the determination of their value might involve
a series of assumptions and estimations, which would not
increase the reliability of such a study.
Of course, as pointed out by David et al. (1992), there
are only few new products that completely lack substitutes.
When saccharin was commercialized, it was on the one
Figure 1. Annual number of research projects fundable with
ﬁscal income from saccharin operations.
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hand the ﬁrst noncaloric synthetic sweetener known, but
on the other hand it competed in the ‘market for sweetness’
with sugar. It is, however, very difﬁcult to estimate the true
substitution effect of saccharin consumption. Ballinger
suggested that, ‘[d]ecreased sugar sales probably
amounted to less than 100,000 tons in 1965, although
total usage of noncaloric sweeteners [saccharin and cycla-
mate] was equivalent in sweetness to about 343,000 tons of
reﬁned sugar.’25 Compared with the nine million tons of
reﬁned sugar, which were consumed in 1965 in the USA,
the substitution effect seems small. During wartimes when
sugar was scarce, there was probably no substitution effect
at all. In the ﬁfties the discovery of cyclamates showed
further that saccharin is not unique, as other research
also could lead to a noncaloric sweetener representing a
substitute for saccharin. To increase the validity of future
studies conducted with our approach, the inﬂuence of such
substitution effects on the tax payments could be
estimated. However, it was beyond the scope of the
present research to compare the value of saccharin with
all its noncaloric sweetener substitutes, as implied by
David et al. (1992).
For the present case, we relied heavily on archival
material for our calculations. Despite being an extensive
and largely untapped source of data, the associated limi-
tations should be noted. The intentions underlying the
creation of a document—e.g. an annual report, meeting
minutes, or correspondence—can inﬂuence its content
and thus the information that is derived from it. To
prevent possible biases, we have considered several differ-
ent sources for our calculations whenever available,
making the procedure more laborious. Nevertheless,
some ﬂuctuations in our time series might be related to
the use of archival material of various kinds. The impact
of single ﬂuctuations on the overall result is, however,
small. As mentioned in Section 2, it is possible to rely on
other data sources for future studies based on our
approach. In an ideal case, data obtained directly from
companies could enhance the reliability of the calculations.
Furthermore, to increase external validity, it would be
beneﬁcial to conduct studies on several research projects
based on comparable data sources, e.g. corporate data.
The end result of an evaluation study based on our
method depends not only on the income generated by
the commercialization of an innovation and the sources
used to estimate it but also on the associated research ex-
penditures and the setting of appropriate boundaries re-
garding projects to be included or excluded from the
considerations (Marjanovic et al. 2009). Regarding
research costs, the focus in the present study was laid on
Remsen’s group at The Johns Hopkins University, leaving
out his previous research in Germany and in
Williamstown, MA, as well as complementary research in
organic chemistry. However, we included all the initial
expenses to furnish his laboratory from scratch, outlays
for his entire group—not only for the research leading to
‘benzoic sulﬁnide’—and a period of 5 years, although the
compound was discovered already after 2 years. The
research costs are therefore reasonably calculated and
very unlikely underestimated.
Of course, the investment in Remsen’s research does not
reﬂect the total cost involved to arrive at saccharin as a
research result—an issue that is not unique to our study.
‘Because of the cumulative nature of science, this total in-
vestment may have extended over decades or centuries’
(Mansﬁeld 1991: 6). However, ﬁrst of all, at the time
Remsen started his research at The Johns Hopkins
University, these were sunk costs (ibid.). Secondly, as
Griliches (1958) showed, the problem can be reduced
ad absurdum when taking more and more past research
into consideration. Lastly, the compilation of the beneﬁts
is limited as well by focusing on Monsanto’s tax payments
only, which balances the effect.
The costs associated with the commercialization of a
research result are generally not limited to the direct
expenses of the research group(s) involved. They include
further developmental work and other expenditures
contributing to a successful market introduction. These
costs need to be considered for studies based on our
approach, as long as they were publicly ﬁnanced. In the
case of saccharin, Fahlberg’s expenses for the synthesis
optimization as well as for the commissioned safety
studies should be excluded, as they were compensated by
private proﬁts. By contrast, the costs associated with
publicly funded safety studies-for instance, the Remsen
board-would need to be considered to increase the
validity of our study.
Furthermore, it is conceivable that some projects
associated with average research costs require above-
average investments for commercialization. This could
possibly translate into higher sales margins and thus
higher returns on the initial research outlays when
calculated with our method. However, this fact does not
represent a ﬂaw of our approach; private investors will
only commit large amounts of resources to commercializa-
tion when they can expect high returns. Of course, such
high returns are associated with high tax payments and
thus higher beneﬁts in regard of the initial research
investment.
Finally, it should be mentioned that saccharin was
commercialized rather linearly (Warner 2008). Although
this might be common in chemistry (David et al. 1992),
other innovations are frequently based on knowledge dif-
fusion from several different research areas. Such research
can be evaluated with our method as well, but the process
might be more complex.
5. Conclusion
Herein we have proposed that tax payments accruing
from the commercialization of research ﬁndings can be
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used to assess the economic returns to publicly funded
research. Our method can potentially complement
existing tools in future evaluation studies. We have dis-
cussed the advantages of our approach—the use of a
direct measure, its intuitiveness, the consideration of
different levels of complexity, the need of fewer theor-
etical assumptions compared with other assessment
tools and its applicability to different types of research—
and described its limitations—only projects that led or
will lead to identiﬁable tax-relevant impacts can be
considered.
We have demonstrated the application of our approach
with the example of saccharin, and we found a conserva-
tively calculated beneﬁt to cost ratio of more than 10 to 1
and an IRR of more than 7%. From an annualized per-
spective, on average more than 1.5 similarly sized research
projects could have been sustained in every single of
Monsanto’s 72 years of saccharin production with the re-
spective tax payments.
Although the case offered a unique long-term valuation
perspective, owing to the discovery of saccharin already in
1878, our study seen individually cannot serve for public
accountability purposes, which have gained popularity
(Luukkonen-Gronow 1987; Arnold and Bala´zs 1998).
However, future research evaluation studies could beneﬁt
from the application of our approach in addition to the
established methods, as the latter largely neglected tax
payments.
In the context of quantitative evaluations of publicly
funded R&D programs, ofﬁces or agencies collect data
on the respective research expenses. These data can be
used to complement the studies with an assessment of
the economic effects with our approach. The strategies to
obtain the additionally required information on tax
incomes vary depending on the speciﬁcs of the programs
under evaluation. Cases having broad impacts on many
companies or even an entire industry will beneﬁt from
the estimations of tax revenues in sector studies.
For instance, the economic contributions of the biotech-
nology industry to the US economy including its
tax revenues were assessed by Ernst and Young (2000).
By contrast, in cases having speciﬁc impacts on a clearly
identiﬁable set of companies, e.g. licensees, the agencies
should collaborate with these companies—ensuring conﬁ-
dentiality—to obtain appropriate data. Perhaps the provi-
sion of data could even be included in the licensing
contracts.
An entire team of evaluators could further pay attention
to the aspects neglected in the valuation of saccharin, as
mentioned in Section 4 above. Thus, complementing future
evaluation studies with our approach could lead to a more
complete appreciation of the economic impacts of publicly
funded research, as there is no general method, which can
take into account all the inﬂuences of basic research at
once (Tassey 2003).
Supplementary data
Supplementary data is available at REEVAL Journal
online.
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Notes
1. Although Remsen’s research was funded by the en-
dowment of Johns Hopkins, he was free to pursue
projects satisfying his own curiosity. He was not
obliged to consider possible interests of a sponsor.
Therefore, it is legitimate to use the saccharin case as
a proxy for publicly funded curiosity-driven research.
2. The annual reports are contained in the Monsanto
Company Records (MCR) held by the University
Archives, Department of Special Collections,
Washington University Libraries, St. Louis, MO.
Annual reports 1924–49: series 36, box 1; annual
reports 1950–63: series 8, box 2; annual reports
1964–72: series 8, box 4. Pre-1924 ﬁgures (total
assets, total sales) were extracted from: Foristall,
T.M. ‘The Merit of Monsanto’, BARRON’S The
National Financial Weekly, 3 July 1933, 6, series 10,
box 1, folder Chemical Industry (General History
[1900–50]); Monsanto Chemical Company and
Subsidiary Companies Financial Data, ca. 1953,
series 10, box 4, folder Finance (History); John F.
Queeny to A. C. F. Meyer, Cashier, South Side
Bank of St. Louis, 18 January 1911, series 10, box 4.
3. In 1904 the three scenarios were not developed accord-
ing to the general rule described in the text because it is
very probable that the capital bound in saccharin pro-
duction is still very high.
4. Ledgers Sales, Cash Receipts, Mchds Charges, Mchds
Credits January 1906–January 30 1907 and Sales,
Cash & Journal February 1907–January 1908, MCR,
series 10, subseries 2, ﬂat box 33.
5. ‘Annual statement for 1910 shows very satisfactory
results. [. . .] Made $54,000 on caffeine with 1$ proﬁt
per pound, about $8000 each on saccharin and phe-
nolphthalein, $6000 on chloral hydrate, small loss
on phenacetin, 10,000 loss on vanillin.’ Jules Bebie’s
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diary, ca. 1911, MCR, series 10, box 5, folder
Monsanto Company History (Historical Accounts
[Bebie, Jules]).
6. 10 March 1920, MCR, series 14, box 22, folder
Queeny, J. F. (scrapbooks [copies of]).
7. As Seater (1982) notes, his excess proﬁt tax rates are
weighted averages of graduated rates. As it is not
possible to derive the exact rate applicable to
Monsanto, the stated average rates are used for the
calculations. Thereby, it is not discriminated between
normal and excess proﬁts, as the application of the
excess tax rate to the entire income still underestimates
the total tax burden from 1915 through 1919 (approxi-
mately $910,000 from our calculations versus more
than $2 million stated in the leaﬂet ‘Information re-
garding Monsanto for purchasers of Mortgage’).
8. These reports can be downloaded from <http://
archive.org/details/syntheticorganic19yyunit> (substi-
tute yy for respective years), last access: 12 July 2013.
9. Ballinger, R.A., United States Department of
Agriculture, Noncaloric Sweeteners: Their Position in
the Sweetener Industry (hereafter: Ballinger), May
1967, RG 88, box 3978, folder 482 1967, National
Archives II, College Park, MD.
10. Falling prices are rather unexpected, as Monsanto was
the only US producer beginning in 1925. However,
this might have been a good strategy to render the
market unattractive for newcomers or to counter
imports. Maybe, the introduction of the insulin
therapy in the twenties also inﬂuenced saccharin
pricing. Later, during the economic downturn,
pressure on prices was generally high.
11. A further rationale for a rather high percentage of
saccharin sales in respect of total residual ﬂavor sales
is the possible underreporting from Monsanto as in
the year 1919.
12. Report in Connection with Renegotiation of War
Contracts for the Year Ended December 31, 1942,
1943, MCR, series 10, box 7, folder Monsanto
Company History (World War II [Re-negotiation of
War Contracts (1942)]).
13. Report in Connection with Renegotiation of War
Contracts for the Year Ended December 31, 1942
(resp. 1943), 1943 (resp. 1944), MCR, series 10,
box 7, folder Monsanto Company History (World
War II [Re-negotiation of War Contracts (1942,
resp. 1943)]).
14. A. P. Kroege, List of products of which Monsanto is the
major producer, 21 November 1951, MCR, series 1,
box 5, folder Organic Chemicals Division (Sales).
15. Ballinger.
16. ‘Sweetness Sans Sucrose’, Chemical Week, 13 October
1951, RG 88, box 3978, folder 482 1967, National
Archives II.
17. Ballinger.
18. Press release relating to saccharin price cuts, 26
October 1959, MCR, series 3, box 3, folder
Saccharin (History).
19. Ballinger.
20. Monsanto, 1962 annual report, 1963, MCR, series 8,
box 2, and press release relating to increased saccharin
production capacities, series 3, box 3, folder Saccharin
(History).
21. Charles C. Edwards, Commissioner of Food and
Drugs, to James J. Delaney, member of the House of
Representatives, 25 May 1970, RG 88, box 4609,
folder 482 ‘Saccharin’ 1970–March 9 1972 Vol. I,
National Archives II. This estimate was used to calcu-
late Monsanto’s 1970 saccharin sales.
22. Press release relating to saccharin price reduction, 5
August 1964,MCR, series 3, box 3, Saccharin (History).
23. The values of the years 1919–72, as well as 1876–99
were discounted using the yields of long-term US gov-
ernment bonds (series Cj1192 in Carter et al. (2006)).
The values of the years 1900–18, for which data from
US government level is lacking, were discounted using
yields of long-term high-grade municipal bonds (series
Cj1193), which do not differ substantially from the
values in Cj1192 in the years when both are available.
24. The purchasing power index and the gross domestic
product deﬂators published by Ofﬁcer, Lawrence H. &
Williamson, Samuel H., MeasuringWorth, www.
measuringworth.com (last access 30 June 2013),
2011, were used for the calculations, as there is no
perfect measure for the values to be indexed.
However, the ﬁnal results of the two methods do not
differ substantially, and therefore, only the result
obtained with the purchasing power index is shown.
25. Ballinger, iv.
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